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“I

HOPE THESE are the robots that take over the earth.”1
Comedian Aziz Ansari was talking about Tacocopter, a
faux-Silicon Valley start-up that promises “flying robots” that deliver tacos.2 Although Tacocopter’s creator insists that the website is not a joke,3 Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
regulations and logistical concerns mean that Americans are unlikely to see airborne taco-delivery machines anytime soon.4
A future of flying tacos, however, is not out of the question.
Tacocopter is only one of the many contemplated uses for unmanned aircraft in America’s civil airspace, the national airspace system (NAS).5 Unmanned aircraft are already being
used to monitor U.S. borders and collect atmospheric data, and
the technology could prove essential for police and firefighters
seeking alternative vantages during dangerous situations, for
scientists studying pristine ecosystems, and even for companies
delivering cargo.6
Unmanned aircraft have already become a big business, and
the sector is growing quickly. Annual worldwide unmanned air1 Salvador Rodriguez, Tacocopter the Latest in a Rich Tradition of Internet Hoaxes,
L.A. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/mar/28/business/
la-fi-tn-tacocopter-internet-hoax-20120328.
2 Tacocopter: One-Click Taco Delivery in the SF Bay Area, TACOCOPTER, http://
tacocopter.com/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2012).
3 Rodriguez, supra note 1.
4 Jason Gilbert, Tacocopter Aims to Deliver Tacos Using Unmanned Drone Helicopters,
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 23, 2012, 5:33 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2012/03/23/tacocopter-startup-delivers-tacos-by-unmanned-drone-helicopter_n_
1375842.html.
5 See, e.g., Jefferson Morley, States Fight for Drone Biz, SALON (May 30, 2012, 9:19
AM), http://www.salon.com/2012/05/30/states_fight_for_drone_biz/singleton/ (noting that military expenditures make up the vast majority of the unmanned aircraft market); Predator Drones and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), N.Y.
TIMES–TIMES TOPICS, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/
subjects/u/unmanned_aerial_vehicles/index.html?8qa (last updated Sept. 26,
2012) (describing unmanned aircraft and linking to recent articles on the topic).
6 NPR Staff, What Will We Watch as Drones Evolve?, GPB (July 30, 2011, 6:30
AM), http://www.gpb.org/news/2011/07/30/what-will-we-watch-as-dronesevolve# (noting the use of small unmanned aircraft for hostage situations and the
potential use by Federal Express and United Parcel Service for shipping); Richard Conniff, Drones Are Ready for Takeoff, SMITHSONIAN MAG., June 2011, http://
www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/Drones-are-Ready-for-Takeoff.html
(noting the use of drones by border patrol and first responders and the possibility of monitoring low-altitude weather data to achieve “good storm-intensity forecasts” to allay the “huge economic costs”); Jeff Tollefson, Unmanned Planes Take
Wing for Science, NATURE, Mar. 3, 2010, http://www.nature.com/news/2010/
100303/full/464014b.html (discussing the role of unmanned aircraft in collecting atmospheric data).
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craft expenditures are expected to grow from $6.6 billion to
$11.4 billion within a decade.7 Although the market for civil use
currently comprises less than 2% of the worldwide market for
unmanned aircraft, that could change over the next several
years as technology advances and as legislation and regulations
allow broader use of unmanned aircraft in the NAS.8
Unmanned aircraft pose difficult safety and privacy questions
for regulators and citizens. Cheap and easy-to-operate unmanned aircraft could allow local, state, and federal governments to increase aerial surveillance in the United States.9
Moreover, although there is intense political pressure to incorporate unmanned aircraft into the NAS, these aircraft do not yet
have a safety record approaching that of commercial airliners,
and they still cannot adequately “see and avoid” other air
traffic.10
7 Press Release, Teal Grp. Corp., Teal Group Predicts Worldwide UAV Market
Will Total $89 Billion in Its 2012 UAV Market Profile and Forecast (Apr. 11,
2012), available at http://tealgroup.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=
article&id=79:teal-group-predicts-worldwide-uav-market-will-total-89-billion-in-its2012-uav-market-profile-and-forecast&catid=3&Itemid=16.
8 Morley, supra note 5.
9 See Joseph J. Vacek, Big Brother Will Soon Be Watching—Or Will He? Constitutional, Regulatory, and Operational Issues Surrounding the Use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in Law Enforcement, 85 N.D. L. REV. 673, 676–77 (2009) [hereinafter Vacek,
Big Brother Will Soon Be Watching] (noting that a standard police helicopter can
cost $875,000 to purchase and $500 per hour to operate for about 4.5 hours of
flight time with two trained crew members, while an unmanned aircraft, purchased for a fraction of the price, can stay airborne for eight hours for $5 per
hour, without the need for trained crew members).
10 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-981, UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS: MEASURING PROGRESS & ADDRESSING POTENTIAL PRIVACY CONCERNS WOULD
FACILITATE INTEGRATION INTO THE NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM 14–15 (2012) (“To
date, no suitable technology has been deployed that would provide [unmanned
aircraft] with the capability to sense and avoid other aircraft and airborne objects
and to comply completely with FAA regulatory requirements of the national airspace system.”); C. Todd Lopez, Army Radar to Allow UAS to Fly in National Air
Space, U.S. ARMY (July 2, 2012), http://www.army.mil/article/82989/Army_radar
_to_allow_UAS_to_fly_in_National_Air_Space/ (noting that new radar capabilities will allow an unmanned aircraft to enter the NAS by March 2014, but suggesting that until then the Army must have an observer within one mile and 3,000
feet of the unmanned aircraft, either on the ground or in a chase aircraft);
Timothy M. Ravich, The Integration of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles into the National
Airspace, 85 N.D. L. REV. 597, 607 (2009) (stating unmanned aircraft “are less
reliable than manned aircraft over significantly fewer flight hours”); Mark Edward Peterson, The UAV and the Current and Future Regulatory Construct for Integration into the National Airspace System, 71 J. AIR L. & COM. 521, 571 (2006) (quoting
14 C.F.R. § 91.113(b) (2006)) (noting unmanned aircraft’s inability to “see and
avoid” as required by FAA regulations).
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This article describes the short-term regulatory and privacy
hurdles facing the unmanned aircraft industry. Part I discusses
the difficulty of defining “unmanned aircraft” and then examines the regulations and statutes governing unmanned aircraft.
Part II examines the impact of privacy law on government and
private unmanned aircraft operators.
I.

THE REGULATION OF UNMANNED AIRCRAFT

The federal government is wrestling with how to regulate unmanned aircraft. The first step will be to define the category in
such a way as to clarify which existing regulations apply to unmanned aircraft and which do not. This part addresses the current regulations governing unmanned aircraft and the
forthcoming regulatory framework.
A.

DEFINING UNMANNED AIRCRAFT

Unmanned aircraft have been identified by many names
throughout their relatively brief existence.11 Terms have included “drones,” “remotely piloted vehicles,” “unmanned aerial
vehicles,” “unmanned aircraft systems,” and “unmanned aircraft.”12 This article adopts the FAA’s preferred terminology,
“unmanned aircraft.”13
The FAA must define unmanned aircraft to clarify which regulations apply to such aircraft and to ensure that the definition
is broad enough to encompass all forms of unmanned aircraft
without unintentionally regulating other industries.14 Unmanned aircraft are difficult to define because of their similarities to model aircraft, missiles, and rockets.15 The line between
11 Although unmanned aircraft have only recently become prevalent, “dreams
of early [unmanned aircraft] pioneers began to form alongside manned aviation,” and unmanned aircraft “were tested before and during World War I.” Peterson, supra note 10, at 528, 535.
12 Id. at 528.
13 See Unmanned Aircraft (UAS)—Questions and Answers, FAA (Oct. 14, 2011,
11:08 AM), http://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/uas/uas_faq/#Qn1.
14 See Peterson, supra note 10, at 528–32.
15 See id. at 532 (discussing the differences between unmanned aircraft, rockets, and missiles); Joseph J. Vacek, Civilizing the Aeronautical Wild West: Regulating
Unmanned Aircraft, 23 No. 3 AIR & SPACE LAW., 1, 20 (2011) [hereinafter Vacek,
Civilizing the Aeronautical Wild West] (discussing the line between model aircraft
and unmanned aircraft); see also SMALL UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYS. (SUAS) AVIATION RULEMAKING COMM., COMPREHENSIVE SET OF RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SUAS
REGULATORY DEVELOPMENT 1 (2009), available at http://modelaircraft.org/faa/
recommendations.pdf (explaining that a model airplane is, historically, a radio-
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the groups is blurring. For instance, the Pentagon has tested
new unmanned aircraft the size of model aircraft (approximately two feet long) that can be instructed to dive into targets
and detonate on impact, like a missile.16 Congress recently defined a model aircraft “as an unmanned aircraft that is—(1) capable of sustained flight in the atmosphere; (2) flown within
visual line of sight of the person operating the aircraft; and (3)
flown for hobby or recreational purposes.”17 Under this definition, all that separates a model aircraft from an unmanned aircraft is the manner in which it is used—flown within the
operator’s sight and for recreational purposes.
The diversity of unmanned aircraft also complicates their definition and regulation. Unmanned aircraft come in a wide variety of shapes, sizes, and capabilities.18 For instance, Northrop
Grumman’s RQ-4A Global Hawk has a 116-foot wingspan,
longer than a Boeing 737-300, which suggests that it would be
appropriate to regulate such drones in a manner similar to
manned aircraft.19 By contrast, many unmanned aircraft, even
those used by the military, are the size of model aircraft, which
suggests that they should be regulated differently than larger,
manned aircraft.20 Despite the small size of some unmanned
aircraft, the FAA so far has refused to authorize amateur use of
unmanned aircraft because the flexible rules governing model
aircraft are insufficient to regulate such powerful machines.21
Similarly, Professor Joseph J. Vacek points out that portions of
existing aircraft regulations are inapplicable to unmanned aircontrolled plane that may be a scale model of other aircraft and is flown or collected as a hobby).
16 W.J. Hennigan, Pentagon to Soon Deploy Pint-Sized but Lethal Drones: U.S. Officials Hope They Will Reduce Civilian Casualties and Collateral Damage, L.A. TIMES,
June 11, 2012, at A1.
17 FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 336(c),
126 Stat. 11.
18 Flight of the Drones: Why the Future of Air Power Belongs to Unmanned Systems,
ECONOMIST, Oct. 8, 2011, http://www.economist.com/node/21531433.
19 Compare id. (listing the Global Hawk’s wingspan at 116.2 feet), with 737 Family: 737-700 Technical Characteristics, BOEING, http://www.boeing.com/commercial/737family/pf/pf_700tech.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2012) (listing Boeing
737-300’s wingspan at 112 feet and 7 inches).
20 Hennigan, supra note 16.
21 Vacek, Civilizing the Aeronautical Wild West, supra note 15, at 19 (noting “the
FAA is not willing” to authorize amateur use of unmanned aircraft); see FAA, AC
91-57, ADVISORY CIRCULAR: MODEL AIRCRAFT OPERATING STANDARDS (1981) (listing the only five standards that regulate the operation of model aircraft, including that they should be operated below an altitude of 400 feet and at a distance
from airports and noise-sensitive areas).
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craft, including regulations requiring seatbelts or supplemental
oxygen above certain altitudes and those concerning windshield
strength and the availability of emergency exits.22
The government has yet to settle on a definition for “unmanned aircraft.” Congress’s recent FAA Modernization and
Reform Act of 2012 states that the term “means an aircraft that
is operated without the possibility of direct human intervention
from within or on the aircraft.”23 By contrast, the Department
of Defense defines the category as “[a]n aircraft or balloon that
does not carry a human operator and is capable of flight under
remote control or autonomous programming.”24 Meanwhile,
the FAA defines an unmanned aircraft as “the flying portion” of
an unmanned aircraft system, which is “flown by a pilot via a
ground control system, or autonomously through use of an onboard computer, communication links and any additional
equipment that is necessary for the [unmanned aircraft] to operate safely.”25
B.

THE EXISTING REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
FOR UNMANNED AIRCRAFT

Given the difficulty of defining unmanned aircraft, it is not
surprising that the government has also struggled with how to
regulate the nascent technology. In February 2012, President
Obama signed the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012,
which includes a series of mandates for the FAA to create new
regulations to introduce unmanned aircraft into the NAS.26
This section describes the existing regulatory scheme for unmanned aircraft and discusses the changes mandated by the new
law.
Unmanned aircraft are currently regulated pursuant to the
same regulations that apply to other aircraft, yet “the regulations
do not intuitively apply to” unmanned aircraft.27 Because unVacek, Civilizing the Aeronautical Wild West, supra note 15, at 21.
FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 331, 126
Stat. 11.
24 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUBLICATION 1-02: DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS 327 (2010) (as amended through
Aug. 15, 2012), available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf.
25 Unmanned Aircraft (UAS)—Questions and Answers, supra note 13.
26 Dan Namowitz, Long-Term FAA Bill Signed into Law, AIRCRAFT OWNERS & PILOTS ASS’N (Feb. 14, 2012), http://www.aopa.org/advocacy/articles/2012/1202
14long-term-faa-bill-signed-into-law.html.
27 Tim Adelman & Leonard Ligon, The Law and Operating Unmanned Aircraft in
the U.S. National Airspace System, SUAS NEWS (Mar. 14, 2012), http://www.suas
22
23
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manned aircraft generally cannot meet the requirements of
those regulations, particularly the requirement that aircraft have
the ability to “see and avoid” obstacles, the FAA currently requires a Certificate of Waiver or Authorization (COA) for unmanned aircraft to operate in the national airspace.28
Applications, which can be made on the Internet, are overseen
by Air Traffic Operations, which examines civil (usually experimental) unmanned aircraft to ensure that they are airworthy.29
Military unmanned aircraft do not use the same process to establish airworthiness, but they do need to comply with policies
issued by the various military branches.30
Applicants may apply for an airworthiness certificate for unmanned aircraft for research and development, crew training,
or market surveys, which allow an entity to give demonstrations
and train customers’ flight crews.31 To qualify for a certificate,
the applicant must show the aircraft’s response to losing communication with its operator, protocol if communication cannot
be recovered, and that the unmanned aircraft can be contained
within a proposed flight area.32 The applicant must provide
documentation of: (1) the proposed operating area; (2) the
manuals and checklists associated with the aircraft, including
those for normal and emergency procedures; (3) training for
relevant personnel; (4) evidence of completion of pilot licenses
or other necessary certification; and (5) proof that the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) has approved the frenews.com/012/03/13397/the-law-and-operating-unmanned-aircraft-in-the-u-snational-airspace-system/.
28 FAA, INTERIM OPERATIONAL APPROVAL GUIDANCE 08-01: UNMANNED AIRCRAFT
SYSTEMS IN THE U.S. NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM 4–5 (2008) [hereinafter FAA INTERIM GUIDANCE]; see Adelman & Ligon, supra note 27. Tim Adelman and Leonard Ligon argue persuasively that the COA requirement cannot apply to
unmanned aircraft, controlled by federal or state government agencies, which
are only operated within the line of sight of the operator. Adelman & Ligon,
supra note 27. Nonetheless, public safety entities continue to apply to the FAA
for COAs, and according to the FAA, only two law enforcement entities are consistently using small unmanned aircraft for their operations. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 10, at 26–27.
29 FAA INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 28, at 5.
30 Id. at 7.
31 Airworthiness Certification of Unmanned Aircraft Systems and Optionally
Piloted Aircraft, FAA Order No. 8130.34A, 3-4 (Oct. 27, 2010), available at http://
rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgOrders.nsf/0/57e4fb59279d19
13862577cf005ebf26/$FILE/8130.34A.pdf (explaining that applicants use FAA
Form 8130-7).
32 Id. at 3-1.
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quency of spectrum used to communicate with the aircraft.33
The typical COA is valid for two years.34
Although the FAA initially refused to divulge information
about the COA applications and awards, in response to a lawsuit
by the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the agency released a list
of sixty-one entities that had sought licenses to operate unmanned aircraft in April 2012.35 Of those entities, only four applicants were disapproved, and forty-one of the licenses
remained active.36 Entities with active licenses include universities, federal agencies, local police departments, and branches of
the military.37 These entities vary in size, ranging from the U.S.
Army to the City of Herington, Kansas, which in 2010 had a population of 2,526.38 The list, however, does not divulge the quantities or models of unmanned aircraft that each entity was
licensed to fly.39 The FAA also disseminated a list of thirteen
manufacturers that had applied for licenses to test unmanned
aircraft, complete with model names and serial numbers for the
aircraft they were testing.40 The manufacturers include industry
heavyweights like Raytheon Co., Bell Helicopter Textron Inc.,
and Honeywell International.41 In July 2012, the agency published additional files concerning 125 COA applications from
eighteen entities (all but three of which were on the previously
released list),42 including nine universities and nine other fedId. at 3-2 to 3-3.
FAA Makes Progress with UAS Integration, FAA (May 14, 2012, 3:09 PM), http:/
/www.faa.gov/news/updates/?newsId=68004.
35 Organizations That Have Sought to Use Drones, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 20, 2012),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527023034255045773543628606655
08.html.
36 Id.
37 Id. (e.g., the U.S. Navy, Eastern Gateway Community College, the Seattle
Police Department).
38 Id.; American FactFinder, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://factfinder2.census.gov/
bkmk/table/1.0/en/DEC/10_DP/DPDP1/1600000US2031400 (last visited Sept.
19, 2012).
39 Jennifer Lynch, FAA Releases Lists of Drone Certificates—Many Questions Left Unanswered, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr. 19, 2012), https://www.eff.org/
deeplinks/2012/04/faa-releases-its-list-drone-certificates-leaves-many-questionsunanswered [hereinafter Lynch, FAA Releases I].
40 FAA List of Special Airworthiness Certificates—Experimental Category (SACs), ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr. 16, 2012), https://www.eff.org/document/faalist-special-airworthiness-certificates-experimental-categorysacs.
41 Id.
42 Compare Organizations That Have Sought to Use Drones, supra note 35, with Jennifer Lynch, FAA Releases Thousands of Pages of Drone Records, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (July 13, 2012), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/07/faa33
34
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eral, state, and local governmental bodies.43 Of the 125 applications, however, only eight licenses remain active.44 In August
and September of 2012, the FAA again released information, related to 139 COA files, of which only twenty-four are active.45
While available information outlines the current use of unmanned aircraft in the NAS, the FAA has released insufficient
information to ascertain the full extent of current practices.46
C.

THE FORTHCOMING REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
FOR UNMANNED AIRCRAFT

Congress, dissatisfied with the COA system, required the Secretary of Transportation to make several policy changes in the
FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012.47 Congress mandated a simpler process for issuing certificates to “appropriate
government agencies” seeking to operate unmanned aircraft in
the NAS.48 In addition to requiring an expedited certification
timeframe, the law requires that public safety agencies be allowed to operate unmanned aircraft under 4.4 pounds, as long
as they are within sight of the operator, under 400 feet in altitude, and at least five miles from an airport or other similar location.49 The FAA implemented the Act in May 2012 through an
agreement with law enforcement organizations that allows the
organizations to receive a COA for training and evaluation and,
if they show proficiency, an operational COA to fly unmanned
aircraft of up to twenty-five pounds.50
The Act also requires the FAA to develop a “comprehensive
plan to safely accelerate the integration of civil unmanned aircraft systems into the national airspace system” by November 12,
releases-thousands-pages-drone-records [hereinafter Lynch, FAA Releases II]
(showing the North Little Rock Police Department in Arkansas; the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Agricultural Research Service; and Virginia Tech, which
were not included on the April list).
43 Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), FAA, http://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/uas/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2012).
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 See Lynch, FAA Releases I, supra note 39.
47 See Press Release, Representative Edward J. Markey, Markey Releases Discussion Draft of Drone Privacy and Transparency Act (Aug. 1, 2012), available at
http://markey.house.gov/press-release/markey-releases-discussion-draft-droneprivacy-and-transparency-legislation.
48 FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 334(c),
126 Stat. 11.
49 Id.
50 FAA Makes Progress with UAS Integration, supra note 34.
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2012.51 The law also requires a rulemaking to catalyze the integration of small unmanned aircraft into the NAS and the creation of six test ranges for unmanned aircraft throughout the
country.52 Thus, the regulatory landscape for unmanned aircraft could be very different by 2013.
In its comprehensive plan, the FAA will have to address a variety of problems with incorporating unmanned aircraft into the
NAS. The FAA will have to address safety concerns, coordinate
with outside entities, and decide whether and how to address
privacy concerns.53
As noted above, unmanned aircraft have not developed a
safety record akin to that of more established aircraft types.54
There are several relevant concerns that the FAA will have to
address, but three are the most prevalent. First, the FAA will
need to identify technology (e.g., cameras, radar, even artificial
intelligence) that can obviate the need for regulations requiring
that pilots in the NAS be able to “see and avoid” obstacles in the
air, such as other aircraft.55 Second, the FAA will need to address the appropriate training for unmanned aircraft operators
and the appropriate relationship between the operator and the
device.56 In particular, the FAA will need to decide whether a
pilot can operate more than one device at a time and whether
the pilot must be replaced at specific intervals.57 Third, the regulations will need to stipulate appropriate procedures for when
an unmanned aircraft loses contact with its operators and for
when the connection to the aircraft is hacked by a third party.58
51 H.R. 658 § 332(a)(1) (requiring the plan by 270 days after the statute’s enactment on February 15, 2012).
52 Id. § 332(b)–(c)
53 See Douglas Marshall, Unmanned Aerial Systems and International Civil Aviation
Organization Regulations, 85 N.D. L. REV. 693, 696–97 (2009); Peterson, supra note
10, at 571; JAY STANLEY & CATHERINE CRUMP, ACLU, PROTECTING PRIVACY FROM
AERIAL SURVEILLANCE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR GOVERNMENT USE OF DRONE AIRCRAFT 1–2 (2011).
54 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
55 FAA INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 28, at 2 (suggesting that the inability to
comply with the “see-and-avoid” provisions of 14 C.F.R. § 91.113 is the “[m]ost
notabl[e]” reason that unmanned aircraft cannot comply with regulations for
manned aircraft).
56 Comments from Mark Reed, Staff Engineer, Air Line Pilots Ass’n Int’l, to
FAA, U.S. Dep’t of Transp., Docket No. FAA-2012-0252, Unmanned Aircraft System Test Sites (May 8, 2012), available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FAA-2012-0252-0096.
57 See, e.g., id.
58 See, e.g., Researchers Use Spoofing to “Hack” into a Flying Drone, BBC NEWS
(June 29, 2012, 11:54 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-18643134
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Additionally, the FAA will need to coordinate with other
countries and agencies in setting its regulations.59 Internationally, the FAA must make certain that unmanned aircraft operations comply with U.S. treaty obligations and the rules of the
International Civil Aviation Organization, which help ensure
that U.S. aircraft have access to international airspace.60 The
FAA will also have to work with other domestic agencies.61 For
instance, Congress mandates in the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 that the FAA must coordinate with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the
Department of Defense when choosing test sites for unmanned
aircraft.62 Additionally, the FAA will need to work with other
agencies—likely the FCC and the Department of Defense—to
ensure that sufficient wireless spectrum is available to adhere to
FCC requirements while preparing for a growing number of unmanned aircraft using radio frequencies to communicate with
their operators.63
Finally, the FAA will need to decide whether and how to
tackle privacy concerns raised by the introduction of unmanned
aircraft into the NAS.64 Even if the FAA decides not to address
privacy, FAA regulations are likely to influence the manner in
which courts confront unmanned aircraft, as the next part
illustrates.65
II.

PRIVACY AND UNMANNED AIRCRAFT

The pending introduction of unmanned aircraft into the NAS
has riled many who fear that the new machines will intrude on
(describing how researchers “hacked the GPS system of a drone”); Elisabeth Bumiller, Navy Drone on a Test Flight Violates Restricted Airspace, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26,
2010, at A16 (revealing that a United States Navy drone lost contact with its operators and entered restricted airspace near the District of Columbia).
59 See Marshall, supra note 53.
60 See id.
61 FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 332, 126
Stat. 11.
62 Id.
63 See, e.g., Comments from David Boulos, Sikorsky Aircraft, to FAA, U.S. Dep’t
of Transp., Docket No. FAA-2012-0252, Unmanned Aircraft System Test Sites
(May 8, 2012), available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=
FAA-2012-0252-0222; Comments from Robbie Elaine Hood, Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., to FAA, U.S. Dep’t of Transp., Docket No. FAA-2012-0252,
Unmanned Aircraft System Test Sites (May 8, 2012), available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FAA-2012-0252-0186.
64 See STANLEY & CRUMP, supra note 53.
65 See infra notes 83, 86 and accompanying text.
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their privacy.66 Groups from across the political spectrum have
expressed concern, including the American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU),67 the Electronic Frontier Foundation,68 and Fox
News.69 Judge Andrew Napolitano, a commentator for Fox
News, even suggested that “[t]he first American patriot that
shoots down one of these drones that comes too close to his
children in his backyard will be an American hero.”70 This part
analyzes the Fourth Amendment implications of the government’s use of unmanned aircraft for surveillance and reviews existing laws that could protect privacy from private operators of
unmanned aircraft.71
A.

GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE

AND THE

FOURTH AMENDMENT

Although several academics have concluded that existing law
will not prevent widespread monitoring by unmanned aircraft,
recent case law suggests some limitations on the government’s
See STANLEY & CRUMP, supra note 53; Jennifer Lynch, Are Drones Watching
You?, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Jan. 10, 2012), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/01/drones-are-watching-you [hereinafter Lynch, Are Drones Watching
You?]; Catherine Herridge, Privacy Concerns as U.S. Government Rolls Out Domestic
Drone Rules, FOX NEWS (May 14, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2012/
05/14/privacy-concerns-as-us-government-rolls-out-domestic-drone-rules/.
67 See STANLEY & CRUMP, supra note 53, at 1 (suggesting that unmanned aircraft
will “allow for pervasive surveillance, police fishing expeditions, and abusive use
of these tools in a way that could eventually eliminate the privacy Americans have
traditionally enjoyed in their movements and activities”).
68 Lynch, Are Drones Watching You?, supra note 66.
69 Herridge, supra note 66.
70 Torie Bosch, Would an American Who Shot Down a Surveillance Drone Be Considered a “Hero” By Some?, SLATE (May 16, 2012, 11:54 AM), http://www.slate.com/
blogs/future_tense/2012/05/16/anthony_napolitano_and_charles_krauthammer_on_domestic_surveillance_drones_video_.html (attributing the quote to Napolitano, who was speaking on the Fox News morning show, Fox & Friends).
71 A North Dakota state district judge, Joel D. Medd, was the first judge in the
country to address a motion based on the constitutionality of domestic surveillance using unmanned aircraft when he denied a motion to dismiss charges
against Rodney Brossart and his family, saying that the unmanned aircraft “appears to have had no bearing on these charges being contested.” Jason Koebler,
Court Upholds Domestic Drone Use in Arrest of American Citizen, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Aug. 2, 2012, http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2012/08/02/courtupholds-domestic-drone-use-in-arrest-of-american-citizen. Brossart was arrested
after allegedly chasing a sheriff off his land with a rifle. Brian Bennett, Predator
Drone Was Used in Brossart Arrests, WDAY-TV (Dec. 12, 2011, 3:53PM), http://
www.wday.com/event/article/id/11475/publisher_ID/30/. The sheriff returned and used a predator drone to find Brossart and ensure that he was unarmed before arresting him. Id.
66
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use of unmanned aircraft for extended surveillance.72 This part
will briefly review the Supreme Court cases that led one commentator to conclude that states have the power “to continually
monitor [their] citizens from above.”73 This part will then analyze the potential impact of United States v. Jones,74 the Supreme
Court’s recent Fourth Amendment decision. Finally, it will address the possibility of statutory protection from government use
of unmanned aircraft.
1.

Unmanned Aircraft and Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence Before
Jones

Traditional Supreme Court Fourth Amendment jurisprudence suggests that there is likely no constitutional protection
from aerial surveillance for individuals outside of protected
spaces, such as homes.75 The traditional definition of a search
under the Fourth Amendment comes from Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz v. United States.76 Justice Harlan wrote that governmental activity is a search if it violates “an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy . . . that society is prepared to recognize
as ‘reasonable.’ ”77 In the late 1980s, the Supreme Court decided several cases by applying the Katz test to aerial surveil-

72 See Courtney E. Walsh, Surveillance Technology and the Loss of Something a Lot
Like Privacy: An Examination of the “Mosaic Theory” and the Limits of the Fourth Amendment, 24 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 169, 208–12 (2012); see, e.g., M. Ryan Calo, The Drone
as Privacy Catalyst, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 29, 31 (Dec. 12, 2011), www.stanford
lawreview.org/online/drone-privacy-catalyst (suggesting “the widespread domestic use of drones for surveillance” would be constitutional); Travis Dunlap, Comment, We’ve Got Our Eyes on You: When Surveillance by Unmanned Aircraft Systems
Constitutes a Fourth Amendment Search, 51 S. TEX. L. REV. 173, 175–76 (2009) (advocating that unmanned aircraft should only be used for aerial surveillance where
“currently authorized by Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,” though admitting
that the use of unmanned aircraft “would typically not constitute a Fourth
Amendment search”); Paul McBride, Comment, Beyond Orwell: The Application of
Unmanned Aircraft Systems in Domestic Surveillance Operations, 74 J. AIR L. & COM.
627, 661–62 (2009); Vacek, Big Brother Will Soon Be Watching, supra note 9, at 692
(“It seems the state will have the power, both constitutionally and technologically,
to continually monitor its citizens from above.”).
73 Vacek, Big Brother Will Soon Be Watching, supra note 9, at 692.
74 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
75 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350–52 (1967).
76 See id. at 360–62 (Harlan, J., concurring).
77 Id. at 361 (finding a search where the police attached a microphone to the
outside of a phone booth).
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lance.78 These cases allow the government wide latitude to
monitor people and land from above.79
The Court issued two relevant decisions on the same day in
1986.80 In California v. Ciraolo, the Court found that police
could look into a suspect’s backyard, even the protected curtilage81 around the suspect’s home, from a plane 1,000 feet above
the ground.82 The Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Burger,
wrote that society was not “prepared to honor” an expectation of
privacy from observations that “took place within public navigable airspace” because “[a]ny member of the public flying in this
airspace who glanced down could have seen everything that
these officers observed.”83
The same day, the Court found that the government could
use a powerful camera from a plane to capture details of an industrial plant without implicating the Fourth Amendment.84 As
in Ciraolo, the Court stressed that the impacted company had
not taken steps to shield itself from aerial photography and that
the government had used “navigable airspace.”85
Finally, in 1989, a plurality of the Court wrote in Florida v.
Riley that when a helicopter flying at 400 feet did not violate a
statute or regulation, there was no Fourth Amendment search
because “no intimate details connected with the use of the
home or curtilage were observed, and there was no undue noise,
and no wind, dust, or threat of injury.”86 Justice O’Connor concurred, supplying the fifth vote and arguing that the defining
78 See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449–51 (1989); California v. Ciraolo, 476
U.S. 207, 211–13 (1986); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 234–40
(1986).
79 See Riley, 488 U.S. at 449–51; Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 211–13; Dow Chem. Co., 476
U.S. at 234–40.
80 See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 207; Dow Chem. Co., 476 U.S. at 227.
81 “Curtilage” is a common law concept which extends protection of the home
to the area immediately surrounding the home. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S.
294, 300 (1987). An area is within the curtilage of a home if it is “intimately tied
to the home itself,” as evidenced by “four factors: [(1)] the proximity of the area
claimed to be curtilage to the home, [(2)] whether the area is included within an
enclosure surrounding the home, [(3)] the nature of the uses to which the area
is put, and [(4)] the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by.” Id. at 301.
82 Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 209–13.
83 Id. at 209–15.
84 Dow Chem. Co., 476 U.S. at 239 (“We hold that the taking of aerial photographs of an industrial plant complex from navigable airspace is not a search
prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.”).
85 Id. at 230, 239; see Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 209–13.
86 Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451–52 (1989).
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question was “whether the helicopter was in the public airways at
an altitude at which members of the public travel with sufficient
regularity that Riley’s expectation of privacy from aerial observation was not ‘one that society [was] prepared to recognize as
“reasonable.” ’ ”87
Several conclusions can be drawn from the cases that Professor Vacek calls the “aerial surveillance trilogy”:88
• First, all three decisions have allowed FAA regulation of
public airways to define the parameters of the Fourth
Amendment, and the lower courts have followed suit. Because the Supreme Court has based its decisions on where
people are allowed to, and regularly do, fly aircraft,89 the
FAA’s forthcoming regulations concerning unmanned aircraft could have wide-ranging effects on the manner in
which unmanned aircraft can be used constitutionally for
surveillance, despite the agency’s protests.90 The decisions
also lend credence to Representative Edward J. Markey and
Representative Joe Barton’s concerns represented in a letter to the FAA seeking “information about how the FAA is
addressing” the chance that unmanned aircraft will “enable
invasive and pervasive surveillance without adequate privacy
protections.”91
• Second, the Supreme Court has yet to find that any form of
aerial surveillance is a search, suggesting that the lower
courts may hold that the Fourth Amendment does not restrict the use of unmanned aircraft.92 Professor Vacek
writes that “it seems . . . there is no reasonable expectation
of privacy in any area in open view from above.”93
87 Id. at 454 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 361 (1967)).
88 Vacek, Big Brother Will Soon Be Watching, supra note 9, at 681.
89 See supra notes 83, 85–87 and accompanying text.
90 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 10, at 36 (noting that FAA
officials have argued “that regulating privacy issues” is “outside FAA’s mission”).
91 Letter from Representative Edward J. Markey & Representative Joe Barton,
Congressional Bi-Partisan Privacy Caucus, U.S. House of Representatives, to
Michael P. Huerta, Acting Adm’r of the FAA (Apr. 19, 2012), available at http://
markey.house.gov/sites/markey.house.gov/files/documents/4-19-12.Letter%20
FAA%20Drones%20.pdf.
92 See, e.g., Riley, 488 U.S. at 451–52; California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 209–13
(1986); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986).
93 Vacek, Big Brother Will Soon Be Watching, supra note 9, at 682.
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• Third, despite the relative clarity of Ciraolo, the Court was
split 4-1-4 in Riley, which seemed to reintroduce the possibility of protecting homes and their curtilage from aerial surveillance.94 Although the area viewed in Riley was within the
curtilage of the defendant’s home, all four opinions in the
case suggested that the curtilage may yet allow some form of
protection from aerial surveillance.95 Thus, despite the arguably limited Fourth Amendment rights related to aerial
surveillance, lower courts have bemoaned the “unhappy
state of Supreme Court precedent” in the area.96 Courts
have continued to struggle with the altitude from which the
government can look down onto people and their land.97
For example, the Fourth Circuit has found that even when a
helicopter allegedly flew only thirty-five feet above a criminal defendant’s land, because the prosecution could establish that “such flights were a regular occurrence in the area”
and the helicopter fully complied with FAA regulations, the
94 Compare Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 209–10 (suggesting that curtilage is unprotected), with Riley, 488 U.S. at 451–52 (White, J.) (premising the constitutionality
of the action on the fact that “intimate details connected with the use of the
home or curtilage” were not observed).
95 Compare Riley, 488 U.S. at 450–52 (White, J.) (noting that “the property surveyed was within the curtilage of respondent’s home” but premising the constitutionality of the action on the fact that “intimate details connected with the use of
the home or curtilage” were not observed), and id. at 454 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“The fact that a helicopter could conceivably observe the curtilage at virtually any altitude or angle, without violating FAA regulations, does not in itself
mean that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy from such observation.”), with id. at 456 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Fourth
Amendment would not “tolerate[ ] such an intrusion on privacy and personal
security” as allowing a helicopter “to investigate what is taking place behind the
walls of the curtilage”), and id. at 468 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
prosecution should have had the burden to prove that there was sufficient aerial
traffic and that Riley lacked a reasonable expectation in the privacy of his
curtilage).
96 Pew v. Scopino, 904 F. Supp. 18, 25 (D. Me. 1995).
97 See, e.g., United States v. Boyster, 436 F.3d 986, 992 (8th Cir. 2006) (finding
that evidence could not be suppressed where the defendant failed to show that
flights at an altitude of 100 feet “are so rare as to make aerial surveillance at that
level unreasonable”); Pew, 904 F. Supp. at 25–27 (finding only one of several
instances of helicopter surveillance to be a search under the Fourth Amendment
because that helicopter “was not within navigable airspace” as it flew “directly
over [a home] at an extraordinarily low level”). But see, e.g., United States v.
Saltzman, No. 92-5389, 1993 WL 100082, at *3 (6th Cir. Apr. 5, 1993) (per
curiam) (affirming the district court’s suppression order and noting that “[i]f, in
fact, the officers were flying at an altitude of 125 to 150 feet, their disturbance of
the home would interfere with the defendant’s normal use of his premises”).
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defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated.98
The Sixth Circuit, by contrast, has affirmed the suppression
of evidence based on flights at an altitude four times
higher.99
The aerial surveillance cases suggest that the government has
broad discretion, but the Court added another twist to the surveillance of private spaces in 2001. In Kyllo v. United States,100 it
found “that obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical ‘intrusion into a
constitutionally protected area’ . . . constitutes a search—at least
where . . . the technology in question is not in general public
use.”101 In Kyllo, the use of a thermal imager to ascertain
whether marijuana was being grown in a home was a “ ‘search’
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment” and “presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.”102 Kyllo likely prohibits
the police from using unmanned aircraft equipped with thermal
or other sense-enhancing surveillance to monitor a home without a warrant.103 The Kyllo prohibition applies only so long as
the technology is not in common use; however, as Professor
Vacek suggests, “the test seems to turn on whether Wal-Mart
sells it or not.”104
Traditional Supreme Court Fourth Amendment jurisprudence seems to suggest that there is likely no reasonable expectation of privacy, and thus no constitutional protection of
individuals outside of protected spaces, such as a home, from
aerial surveillance.105 There may be, however, some minimal
coverage within those areas where an individual could reasonably expect privacy.106 There is also protection from unmanned
United States v. Breza, 308 F.3d 430, 434 (4th Cir. 2002).
Saltzman, 1993 WL 100082, at *3 (affirming the district court’s suppression
order and noting that “[i]f, in fact, the officers were flying at an altitude of 125 to
150 feet, their disturbance of the home would interfere with the defendant’s normal use of his premises”).
100 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
101 Id. at 34 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961)).
102 Id. at 29, 40.
103 Dunlap, supra note 72, at 197; Vacek, Big Brother Will Soon Be Watching, supra
note 9, at 683.
104 Vacek, Big Brother Will Soon Be Watching, supra note 9, at 683; accord Dunlap,
supra note 72, at 197.
105 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350–52 (1967).
106 See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 455, 454 (1989) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring).
98
99
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aircraft equipped with sense-enhancing technology that could
allow the government to see inside protected spaces, as long as
the technology is not commonly used.107
2.

Unmanned Aircraft and Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence After
Jones

Although United States v. Jones did not specifically address aerial surveillance, the case suggests the possibility of major
changes in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as a result of
changing technology.108 In Jones, in January 2012, the Supreme
Court unanimously found that the use of a Global Positioning
System (GPS) tracking device on a suspect’s car for twenty-eight
days was a search “within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”109 Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion for five justices, holding that the government commits a Fourth
Amendment search both when it violates the Katz test and when
it physically occupies protected “private property for the purpose of obtaining information.”110 Justice Scalia wrote that the
Fourth Amendment “must provide at a minimum the degree of
protection it afforded when it was adopted.”111 Thus, according
to the Court, “the [g]overnment’s installation of a GPS device
on a target’s vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the
vehicle’s movements, constitutes a ‘search.’ ”112
Justice Alito, concurring in the judgment, emphasized that
the majority opinion would be difficult for lower courts to follow
because of the changes in trespass law since the time of the
country’s founding.113 He would have held, instead, that the
suspect’s “reasonable expectations of privacy were violated by
the long-term monitoring of the movements of the vehicle he
drove.”114 Justice Alito did not define “the point at which the
tracking . . . became a search,” but he said that “the line was
107 Dunlap, supra note 72, at 197; Vacek, Big Brother Will Soon Be Watching, supra
note 9, at 683.
108 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
109 Id. at 948–49.
110 Id. at 949.
111 Id. at 953.
112 Id. at 949.
113 See, e.g., id. at 957 n.2 (Alito, J., concurring) (joined by Justices Ginsburg,
Breyer, and Kagan) (noting that a common law suit for trespass to chattels, unlike today, did not require actual damage to the object allegedly trespassed
against and that the car in that case did not sustain any damage).
114 Id. at 958.
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surely crossed before the [four]-week mark.”115 Highlighting
that the majority’s “trespass-based theory” created “incongruous
results” because it did not impose any constraints on tracking a
car for extended periods of time with “aerial assistance,” Justice
Alito concluded that “[i]n circumstances involving dramatic
technological change, the best solution to privacy concerns may
be legislative.”116
Finally, although Justice Sotomayor joined the majority opinion, she wrote separately to agree with Justice Alito that surveillance over extended periods of time amounts to a search under
the reasonable expectation of privacy test.117 Justice Sotomayor
went further, however, arguing that “it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third
parties.”118 Thus, although the five-justice majority decided the
case on the physical intrusion grounds outlined by Justice Scalia,
five justices (including Justice Sotomayor) also agreed that extended monitoring of a person in public spaces is a search
under the Fourth Amendment.119
Lower courts have struggled to apply Jones.120 Judges have
wrestled with the limitations of the holding because “Jones was
simply concerned with whether the trespass was a search in the
first place, but expressly declined to consider whether that
search was unreasonable without a warrant because the government waived that argument.”121 Despite Justice Alito’s concerns,
Id. at 964.
Id. at 961, 963–64.
117 Id. at 954–55 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
118 Id. at 957.
119 Id. at 949 (majority opinion).
120 See, e.g., United States v. Peter, No. 3:11-CR-132 JD, 2012 WL 1900133, at
*26–27 (N.D. Ind. May 24, 2012) (“[I]t may take courts years to work out the full
ramifications of Jones.”).
121 Id. Courts have also struggled with the relevancy of the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule from Davis v. United States to the Jones decision. See
Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2428 (2011) (refusing to use the exclusionary rule where police conduct “was not culpable in any way,” such as where
there was reliance on existing appellate precedent). Compare, e.g., United States
v. Rosas-Illescas, No. 2:11-CR-492-RDP-HGD, 2012 WL 1946580, at *17 (N.D. Ala.
May 30, 2012) (refusing to suppress evidence collected in good faith via a GPS
device), United States v. Heath, No. CR 12-4-H-DWM, 2012 WL 1574123, at *3
(D. Mont. May 3, 2012) (refusing to suppress evidence captured through use of a
GPS device before the decision in Jones was rendered), and United States v. Fata,
No. 2:11-cr-00188-RLH-CWH, 2012 WL 893743, at *13–18 (D. Nev. Mar. 15,
2012) (finding a violation of the Fourth Amendment pursuant to Jones but refusing to exclude the evidence per Davis), with United States v. Katzin, No. 11-226,
115
116
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courts applying Jones have tended not to grapple with eighteenth-century legal issues.122 Nevertheless, as one judge has suggested, the “competing rationales between the majority” and
concurring opinions in Jones offer insight into “the direction the
Court might lead us in the light of technological advancements
and privacy concerns.”123
In particular, the decision could have repercussions for the
use of unmanned aircraft by governmental agencies. First, the
combination of Justice Alito’s concurrence in the judgment and
Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence strongly suggests that a majority of the Supreme Court would find extended surveillance by
unmanned aircraft to be a search within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.124 Second, eighteenth-century tort law
could provide an alternative justification for requiring unmanned aircraft to maintain a certain altitude above homes they
monitor. Third, Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence could lay the
groundwork for a shift in Supreme Court jurisprudence that
would considerably narrow the constitutional use of unmanned
aircraft for surveillance.
As noted above, Justice Sotomayor agreed with Justice Alito’s
conclusion that extended surveillance, even without physical
contact, can be a search under the Fourth Amendment.125
Thus, that portion of Justice Alito’s opinion carries the support
of five justices. Although the portion would not be considered
binding precedent, it suggests that the Court is likely to find
2012 WL 1646894, at *31 (E.D. Pa. May 9, 2012) (“The risk of institutionalizing a
policy of permitting reliance on non-binding authority, particularly in the face of
other, contrary non-binding authority, at least borders on being categorized as
systemic negligence. Indeed, opening to the [g]overnment the shelter of the
good faith exception in this case would encourage law enforcement to beg forgiveness rather than ask permission in ambiguous situations involving the basic
civil rights. In the face of Jones, this the [c]ourt will not do.”). The application of
the good-faith standard, however, is beyond the scope of this article. For an interesting analysis of the role of Davis in the evolution of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, see Orin S. Kerr, Fourth Amendment Remedies and Development of the
Law: A Comment on Camreta v. Greene and Davis v. United States, in CATO SUPREME COURT REVIEW, 2010–2011 237 (Ilya Shapiro ed., 2011).
122 See, e.g., Peter, 2012 WL 1900133, at *26–27 (not mentioning eighteenthcentury jurisprudence); United States v. Wilkerson, No. 11-027, 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 8527, at *2 (E.D. La. Jan. 23, 2012) (also not mentioning eighteenth-century jurisprudence).
123 Wilkerson, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8527, at *2 n.1.
124 See RICHARD M. THOMPSON II, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 42701, DRONES IN
DOMESTIC SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS: FOURTH AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS AND
LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES 9–10 (2012).
125 See supra notes 114–17 and accompanying text.
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extended monitoring by an unmanned aircraft of “persons,
houses, papers and effects” to be a search under the Fourth
Amendment.126 According to Justice Alito, however, use of GPS
in Jones became a search because it was “long-term monitoring.”127 Thus, it is unlikely that courts would find that shortterm surveillance of individuals in public by unmanned aircraft
implicates the Fourth Amendment. Although the police may
soon have the technological capacity to monitor individuals for
extended periods using unmanned aircraft,128 it could be years
before such a case reaches the courts because the current FAA
regulations require unmanned aircraft used by the police to stay
within sight of their operators.129 Thus, although Jones suggests
a very real constraint on the use of unmanned aircraft by the
government,130 the constraint may not be applicable until FAA
regulations catch up with the technological capability of unmanned aircraft.
Second, although criminal defendants may attempt to exclude evidence located by unmanned aircraft by relying on Justice Scalia’s emphasis on the eighteenth-century law of
trespass,131 they would probably only be successful, at most, in
finding alternative justification for a prohibition on warrantless
flights above homes at low altitudes. These defendants could
cite the common law doctrine of cujus est solum ejus est usque ad
coelum—which at the time of the ratification of the Fourth
Amendment meant that “ownership of the land extended to the
periphery of the universe”—to argue that the use of unmanned
aircraft above their land and, in particular, above their homes, is
akin to the government committing a trespass into the car in
Jones, under eighteenth-century law.132 In 1946, however, the
Supreme Court firmly rejected the continued application of the
doctrine, suggesting that it “has no place in the modern world,”
where “[t]he air is a public highway.”133 Furthermore, even if
the doctrine did apply, it would likely be limited by the “open
fields doctrine,” which holds that the Fourth Amendment does
See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; supra note 114–17 and accompanying text.
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 958 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
128 See Lynch, Are Drones Watching You?, supra note 66 (noting that “[s]ome
newer drones” can track sixty-five people simultaneously, even as far as twenty-five
miles away).
129 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
130 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949–53.
131 See id. at 957 (Alito, J., concurring).
132 See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 260 (1946).
133 Id. at 261.
126
127
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not protect individuals from searches on their land as long as it
is not within the protected curtilage of their “houses.”134 The
courts could, however, consider combining cujus est solum ejus est
usque ad coelum and the open fields doctrine into the idea of an
“aerial curtilage,” a zone of Fourth Amendment protection extending some short distance above a house, from within which
conducting any surveillance from unmanned aircraft would be
considered a search under the Fourth Amendment.
Finally, Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence, albeit in dicta and
the work of only a single justice, suggests that the recent surge in
technological development may lead the Court to “reconsider”
some of its long-standing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.135
That suggestion finds support in Supreme Court precedent, as
the Court has historically responded to technological changes
by “adjust[ing] the level of Fourth Amendment protection to try
to restore the prior equilibrium.”136 Considering the widespread expressions of concern regarding unmanned aircraft’s
potential to reduce Americans’ privacy, the Court may react with
major changes to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.137
Jones provides several hints about how the Supreme Court may
address privacy concerns from unmanned aircraft, but Justice
Alito also suggests that Congress should enact privacy legislation
to handle the concerns.138 Historically, legislatures have not
been particularly responsive to the needs of criminal suspects
and defendants.139 Indeed, Professor Donald Dripps argued
that “the legislature will not impose limits on the police or the
prosecutor unless” either (1) “the courts have declared that certain law enforcement techniques may be constitutional if and
only if these techniques are subjected to legislative regulations”
or (2) “law enforcement methods offend some powerful interest
See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953.
See id. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
136 Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125
HARV. L. REV. 476, 480 (2011). Kerr suggests that even Jones interpreted “the
Fourth Amendment to counter technology’s ability to narrow privacy.” Orin S.
Kerr, Defending Equilibrium-Adjustment, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 84, 89 (2011).
137 See supra notes 66–70 and accompanying text.
138 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 962 (Alito, J., concurring).
139 See, e.g., Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, and the Theory of
Public Choice; Or, Why Don’t Legislatures Give a Damn About the Rights of the Accused?,
44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1079, 1079–81 (1993); William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 780, 785 (2006) (“Scholars generally
agree that American politics is too punitive, discriminatory, and unconcerned
with the interests of the criminal justice system’s targets.”).
134
135
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group.”140 Professor Dripps emphasized that “[e]xamples of legislative indifference to glaring defects in the criminal process
are legion.”141 Professor William Stuntz recognized many of the
same concerns but suggested that the Supreme Court create
“unattractive” default rules in criminal procedure to incentivize
legislatures, which “know more about relevant policy alternatives than courts do,” to legislate criminal procedure.142
Justice Alito, looking to the technological revolution, appears
to follow Professor Stuntz’s recommendation, noting that Congress may respond to the “diminution of privacy that new technology entails” by enacting legislation.143 Given the diverse
outcry against the possibility of privacy-infringing unmanned aircraft144 and the fact that unmanned aircraft could monitor
broad swaths of the population without being limited to particular suspects,145 unmanned aircraft may prove to be an area of
criminal law that could prompt legislative action. Several bills
were introduced in 2012 in attempts to confront privacy concerns raised by the introduction of unmanned aircraft into the
NAS.146 Notably, Representative Austin Scott of Georgia and
Senator Rand Paul of Kentucky have already introduced legislation to require warrants for surveillance by unmanned aircraft.147 The bills are not expected to move quickly through
140
141
142
143

Dripps, supra note 139, at 1082–83.
Id. at 1086.
Stuntz, supra note 139, at 827.
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 962 (Alito, J., concurring); see Stuntz, supra note 139, at

827.
See supra notes 66–70 and accompanying text.
See Lynch, Are Drones Watching You?, supra note 66.
146 See THOMPSON, supra note 124, at 18–19 (discussing a bill introduced by
Representative Ted Poe to require a warrant and a felony investigation for the
use of unmanned aircraft by law enforcement, and discussing attempts by representatives and senators to control the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s
use of unmanned aircraft to monitor farms).
147 Jen DiMascio, Legislators Draft Bill to Govern Commercial Use of UAVs, AVIATION
DAILY, June 21, 2012, at 4. In the House, the bill simply states that, apart from
exceptions for border patrol, exigent circumstances, and “to counter a high risk
of a terrorist attack,” anyone “acting under the authority of the United States
shall not use a drone to gather evidence or other information pertaining to criminal conduct or conduct in violation of a regulation except to the extent authorized in a warrant issued under the procedures described in the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure.” Preserving Freedom from Unwarranted Surveillance Act of
2012, H.R. 5925, 112th Cong. § 2-3 (2d Sess. 2012). The Senate version of the
bill extends the prohibition to any person or entity “funded in whole or in part
by” the federal government, and—unlike the House version, which allows for
only a “civil action” in response—renders any evidence garnered “in violation of
this Act” inadmissible “in any court of law in the United States.” Compare Preserv144
145
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Congress,148 but the Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems
International (AUVSI), an association with over 2,100 members
that has proven an effective lobbying force for proponents of
unmanned aircraft,149 has already created a relationship with
the ACLU to help policymakers craft privacy rules for unmanned aircraft.150 The result of that partnership and any legislation could shape the role of unmanned aircraft in the United
States for the foreseeable future.151
B.

PRIVATE OPERATORS

OF

UNMANNED AIRCRAFT

AND

PRIVACY

Although Representative Scott and Senator Paul’s proposed
legislation addresses only privacy concerns stemming from the
government’s use of unmanned aircraft,152 AUVSI and the
ACLU may attempt to address privacy concerns from non-governmental entities’ operation of unmanned aircraft in the NAS.
Even without legislation, however, existing statutes and common
law causes of action may provide some protection for privacy.
These laws vary widely across states, however, and there is no
single national standard that would apply to unmanned aircraft
today. This part will briefly address the criminal and civil liabiling Freedom from Unwarranted Surveillance Act of 2012, S. 3287, 112th Cong.
§§ 3, 6 (2d Sess. 2012), with H.R. 5925 § 4.
148 See DiMascio, supra note 147, at 4.
149 About Us, ASS’N FOR UNMANNED VEHICLE SYS. INT’L, http://www.auvsi.org/
home/aboutus/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2012).
150 Jen DiMascio, Groups Seek Input on Privacy Rules for Civilian-Use UAVs, AVIATION DAILY, Apr. 6, 2012, at 3.
151 AUVSI has already attempted to address the “unique challenges and opportunities” of unmanned aircraft through a “Code of Conduct” for the unmanned
aircraft industry, with commitments for operators and manufacturers, including
“not operat[ing] [unmanned aircraft] in a manner that presents undue risk to
persons or property on the surface or in the air,” “cooperat[ing] fully with federal, state, and local authorities in response to emergency deployments, mishap
investigations, and media relations,” and “respect[ing] the privacy of individuals.”
ASS’N FOR UNMANNED VEHICLE SYS. INT’L, UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS OPERATIONS INDUSTRY “CODE OF CONDUCT” (2012), available at http://higherlogicdown
load.s3.amazonaws.com/AUVSI/958c920a-7f9b-4ad2-9807-f9a4e95d1ef1/Up
loadedFiles/AUVSI%20UAS%20Operations%20Code%20of%20Conduct%20-%
20Final.pdf. This code, however, is not binding, and other groups, such as the
ACLU, have suggested it is insufficient “to quell privacy concerns.” Kevin Begos,
Conduct Code for Unmanned Aircraft is Unveiled, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 3, 2012,
(quoting Chris Calabrese, an ACLU lobbyist), available at http://www.boston.
com/business/news/2012/07/03/conduct-code-for-unmanned-aircraftunveiled/d1JdYtOI3evkf0uafnzBXL/singlepage.html.
152 See H.R. 5925.
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ity that private unmanned aircraft operators may encounter
when they are accused of violations of privacy.
1.

Criminal Liability Under Privacy Laws for Unmanned Aircraft
Operators

Operators of unmanned aircraft may have to wrestle with a
variety of criminal statutes depending on the states in which
they operate the aircraft. Every state criminalizes certain forms
of surveillance or recording, often through “Peeping Tom”
laws.153 As the name suggests, however, many of the pertinent
laws extend only to surreptitious photography, recording of potentially sexualized content, or recording in or near “a place
where one may reasonably expect to be safe from surveillance,”
such as a bathroom or changing room.154 Unmanned aircraft
may also implicate state laws related to stalking, especially if the
aircraft trespasses while conducting surveillance or if it acts as an
eavesdropping device.155 Thus, while private operators of unmanned aircraft will have to avoid inadvertently violating existing state laws, state legislatures will have to grapple with the
possibility of writing new statutes that more directly address the
technology and the potential for non-licentious invasions of
privacy.
153 See NAT’L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS’N & NAT’L CTR. FOR PROSECUTION OF CHILD
ABUSE, VOYEURISM STATUTES 2009 (2009), available at http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/
voyeurism_statutes_mar_09.pdf; see, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1171 (Supp. 2012)
(imposing fines, imprisonment, or both for the use of “photographic, electronic
or video equipment in a clandestine manner for any illegal, illegitimate, prurient,
lewd or lascivious purpose with the unlawful and willful intent to view, watch,
gaze or look upon any person without the knowledge and consent of such person
when the person viewed is in a place where there is a right to a reasonable expectation of privacy”).
154 ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 511 (Supp. 2011) (criminalizing the use, “in a
private place without the consent of the person or persons entitled to privacy in
that place, [of] any device for observing, photographing, recording, amplifying
or broadcasting sounds or events in that place”); see, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-7801 (Supp. 2011) (extending only to surreptitious photography of “another person’s intimate parts”); D.C. CODE § 22-3531 (2010) (making it a crime to “record”
someone who is in the bathroom, changing clothes, or “[e]ngaging in sexual
activity,” or “to intentionally capture an image of a private area of an individual”);
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 250.45 (McKinney 2012) (effective Aug. 11, 2003) (criminalizing the use of “an imaging device to surreptitiously view, broadcast or record”
someone dressing or to use such a device “in a bedroom, changing room, fitting
room, restroom, toilet, bathroom, washroom, shower or any room assigned to
guests or patrons in a motel, hotel or inn”).
155 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-11-32 (2005); ALA. CODE § 13A-11-33 (2005).
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Civil Liability for Privacy Torts of Unmanned Aircraft Operators

In addition to the potential criminal liability for operators of
unmanned aircraft for infringing on privacy, common law privacy torts could reach operators of unmanned aircraft.156 Like
criminal liability, tort liability will be determined by “the local
law of the state where the invasion occurred.”157 Although state
tort law can vary, one student commentator has provided an extended discussion, concluding that tort law should protect individuals from “visual aerial surveillance of private residences.”158
Generally, operators of unmanned aircraft will have to be most
concerned with “unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of
another.”159
“One who invades the right of privacy of another” is “subject
to liability for the resulting harm to the interests of the
other.”160 The tort of unreasonable intrusion on seclusion, however, is generally actionable only if the intrusion is “highly offensive to a reasonable person.”161 The victim must be in a private
place (thus, for instance, excluding liability for pictures of a
plaintiff in a public place) unless the intrusion involves access to
matters “that are not exhibited to the public gaze,” such as
someone’s undergarments.162 If a plaintiff could show that the
operator of an unmanned aircraft violated the plaintiff’s privacy
within those limited parameters, the plaintiff could recover “for
(a) the harm to his interest in privacy resulting from the invasion; (b) his mental distress proved to have been suffered if it is
of a kind that normally results from such an invasion; and (c)
156 As with any technology that can travel across state lines, unmanned aircraft
could create interesting jurisdictional issues for state courts. However, the issue
is beyond the scope of this article.
157 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 152 (1971). The place of
invasion in an intrusion upon solitude “is the place where the plaintiff was at the
time.” Id. § 152 cmt. c.
158 Jeremy Friedman, Note, Prying Eyes in the Sky: Visual Aerial Surveillance of
Private Residences as a Tort, 4 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, ¶ 3, 6 (2002–2003).
159 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977). Other privacy torts recognized by the Restatement but unlikely to be implicated by unmanned aircraft
include “appropriation of name or likeness” and “publicity given to private life.”
Id. §§ 652C, 652D. In addition to the possibility of liability for privacy torts
against individuals, the Fifth Circuit has held that the use of overhead surveillance to steal trade secrets is tortious. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1015 (5th Cir. 1970).
160 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977).
161 Id. § 652B.
162 Id. § 652B cmt. c.
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special damage of which the invasion is a legal cause.”163 State
courts and, where appropriate, state legislatures will need to
wrestle with whether or not to adapt existing causes of action to
respond to the increasing use of unmanned aircraft.
III.

CONCLUSION

The actions that the FAA and state and federal legislatures
take today will define the way unmanned aircraft are introduced
to—and remain in—U.S. civilian airspace. Despite Aziz Ansari’s
wishes, it may be many years before they become a pervasive
presence and even longer before unmanned flying machines deliver food. What is clear, however, is that unmanned aircraft are
on their way, and the legal system must adjust accordingly.
163

Id. § 652H.

